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(Not) losing out from Brexit
Annette Schrauwen*
Brexit is a personal concern for EU citizens living in the UK and UK 
citizens living in the EU. They fear their rights will become bargaining 
chips in the negotiations. This article makes an inventory of what would 
happen without withdrawal agreement, and looks at the possibilities 
for securing residence and social security rights post Brexit based on 
current EU, international and national law. It takes into account how 
actors other than the negotiating parties might press for guarantees 
outside the negotiating framework. The article concludes that personal 
concerns are justified. However, Brexit also inspires non-state actors to 
secure rights and their activities go beyond the occasional lobbying for 
a particular outcome in the negotiation process.
1. Introduction
British citizens living, working or studying in EU Member States worry 
about the consequences of Brexit for their daily lives.1 EU citizens 
decide to leave the UK or seriously consider doing so.2 While many fear 
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1 See e.g. the website of the organization Expat Citizen Rights in EU http://www.
ecreu.com/index.html, and reports on the leaked document drawn by the EP legal affairs 
committee: Daniel Boffey, ‘Britons Living in the EU Face Brexit Backlash, Leaked Paper Warns’ 
The Guardian (13 February 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/13/
uk-treatment-of-eu-nationals-could-lead-to-backlash-against-britons-living-in-the-eu.
2 See e.g. Lisa O’Carroll, ‘Dutch Woman with Two British Children Told to Leave UK after 
24 Years’ The Guardian (28 December 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/
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they will be used as bargaining chips, now that the government has 
repeatedly refused to offer any guarantee to EU citizens staying in the 
UK before withdrawal negotiations start,3 the Scottish government, in 
its document ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’4 underlines the advantages of 
free movement of persons for Scotland and wants it to continue.5
Brexit is not only a personal concern for EU citizens presently 
living in the UK or UK citizens presently living in other EU Member 
States.6 Social security entitlements of all EU citizens who have worked 
or lived in the UK and of British citizens who have worked or lived 
in another Member State may be at risk.7 Students wonder whether 
they will be able to afford to study across the Channel.8 And, looking 
beyond residence rights, people living in Northern Ireland9 fear the 
consequences of Brexit for their daily lives, as do people in Gibraltar.10 
And with good reason as the case of Gibraltar shows: its future became 
the first dispute of the exit talks, when EU draft negotiation guidelines 
aroused discussions including the word ‘war’.11
dec/28/dutch-woman-with-two-british-children-told-to-leave-uk-after-24-years. The Dutch 
newspaper De Volkskrant reported on 7 January 2017 on Dutch citizens leaving the UK, 
14–15.
 3 See the February 2017 UK government report The United Kingdom’s Exit from and New 
Partnership with the European Union 30 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
the-united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-white-
paper.
 4 Scottish Government, ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’ (20 December 2016) http://www.
gov.scot/Publications/2016/12/9234.
 5 See e.g. point 68 of the document: ‘As an economy, we need the inward flow of people 
not just to support the growth of our businesses and services, but to provide diversity and 
vibrancy to our communities.’
 6 About 3.5 million EU citizens lived in the UK in the first trimester of 2016; see C Vargas-
Silva and Y Markaki, ‘EU Migration to and from the UK’, Briefing, The Migration Observatory 
at the University of Oxford (31 October 2016) http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/
resources/briefings/eu-migration-to-and-from-the-uk/; about 1.2 million British citizens 
lived in another EU Member State according to UN estimates published by Migration 
Watch UK. For an overview per State, see https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-
paper/354. Both sites indicate how they calculated their estimates.
 7 See E Guild, ‘Brexit and Social Security in the EU’ CEPS Commentary (17 November 
2016) https://www.ceps.eu/publications/brexit-and-social-security-eu.
 8 See Daniel Wittenberg, ‘Five Ways Theresa May’s Brexit Strategy is Terrible for Students’ 
The Guardian (18 January 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/jan/18/
five-ways-theresa-mays-brexit-strategy-hard-on-young-people-eu-international-students-
erasmus.
 9 The preamble of the agreement between the UK and Irish governments, part of the 
Good Friday Agreement, states: ‘Wishing to develop still further the unique relationship 
between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly 
neighbours and as partners in the European Union.’
10 Brian Reyes, ‘Govt’s Stark Analysis Highlights Brexit Border Challenge’ Gibraltar 
Chronicle (17 January 2017) http://chronicle.gi/2017/01/govts- st ark- ana ly sis- high lig 
hts- brexit-border-challenge/.
11 ‘Brexit and Gibraltar: May Laughs Off Spain “War” Talk’ BBC News (3 April 2017) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39475127.
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It is impossible to predict whether the outcome of the Brexit nego-
tiations will be able to take away these concerns. The UK government 
has initially ignored the strong recommendation included in the House 
of Lords European Union Committee report Brexit: Acquired Rights12 to 
strike a positive note for the start of the negotiations with a unilateral 
guarantee to safeguard EU citizenship rights of all EU nationals in the 
UK after the UK withdraws from the EU. The second recommenda-
tion from the report, notably agreeing on EU citizenship rights as a 
preliminary and separate element of the negotiations as soon as Article 
50 is triggered, seems off the table as well. Both negotiating parties 
have indeed confirmed their intention to prioritize citizens’ rights in 
the negotiations,13 but the EU seems to block the possibility of settling 
individual items separately.14
This article will focus on the important right to work and live 
in another Member State without losing social security entitlements, 
a right connected to EU citizenship. The article looks at the possibili-
ties that positive EU, national and international law might offer to 
secure residence and social security entitlements, and how potential 
gaps in protection could be remedied regardless of the result of the 
negotiations on a future relationship between the UK and the EU. At 
the same time it will look at opportunities that actors other than the 
negotiating parties have either to influence the negotiating process or 
to press for guarantees of citizenship rights outside the negotiation 
process.
A preliminary remark with respect to the doctrine of acquired 
rights needs to be made. Though Article 70 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties determines that termination of a treaty does 
not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created 
through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination, it has not 
much to offer to citizens. The provision only refers to the parties of the 
treaties, and does not guarantee acquired rights of citizens. Neither 
does international customary law offer much help; not in the scope 
12 House of Lords Committee on the European Union, Brexit: Acquired Rights (HL 2016–
17, 82) 25–8 (14 December 2016) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/
ldselect/ldeucom/82/8202.htm.
13 See Prime Minister’s letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50 (29 March 2017) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-
triggering-article-50 4, point ii and General Secretariat of the Council, ‘Draft Guidelines 
following the United Kingdom’s Notification under Article 50 TEU’ (31 March 2017, XT 
21001/17) 5, point 8.
14 ‘Draft Guidelines’ (n 13) 3, point 2.
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of the concept of ‘acquired rights’ – residence rights are not acquired 
rights, nor in is there the possibility to enforce acquired rights.15
2. Residence rights for UK nationals in the EU based on 
EU primary law
Primary law, in particular Article 20 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), is unlikely to offer British citizens in the EU 
a basis for an autonomous residence right post Brexit. They are ipso 
facto no longer EU citizens. Based on the ruling by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) in the Rottmann case,16 the argument can be made 
that UK citizens are in a position capable of causing them to lose EU 
citizenship and the rights attached thereto. Such a situation falls ‘by 
reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European 
Union law’.17 However, the loss will happen simultaneously with the 
UK’s exit, and puts into practice the will of the people to withdraw 
as expressed in a referendum. Mindus argues that legally the loss of 
EU citizenship can be qualified as involuntary when it is not a case of 
individual renunciation.18 She continues that loss of EU citizenship 
could be tested against general principles of EU law, such as proportion-
ality, equality, legitimate expectations and access to court.19 Even if this 
were the case,20 possibilities to challenge the loss of status are limited, 
and if ever a preliminary question is referred, it is highly unlikely that 
the ECJ will apply its Rottmann doctrine to loss of EU citizenship as a 
result of Brexit. As Mindus acknowledges, it would imply a decoupling 
of nationality and EU citizenship, which from a democratic point of 
view is not a decision for the ECJ to make.21
15 See the conclusions with respect to acquired rights in Brexit: Acquired Rights (n 12) 
25–8, and J-C Piris, ‘Should the UK Withdraw from the EU: Legal Aspects and Effects of 
Possible Options’ Foundation Robert Schuman Policy Paper, European Issues (5 May 2015) 
nr. 355.
16 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern ECLI:EU:C:2010:104.
17 ibid para 42.
18 See P Mindus, European Citizenship after Brexit https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id+2842500, 16.
19 See R de Groot, ‘Survey on the Rules on Loss of Nationality in International Treatises 
and Case Law’ (August 2013) 57 CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe 20.
20 J Vidmar argues that this is too broad a reading of the ECJ’s citizenship doctrine 
and that the Court in Rottmann continued to subordinate EU citizenship to citizenship of 
a Member State: ‘The Scottish Independence Referendum in an International Context’, 
(2014) 51 CYIL 259–88, 280–1.
21 Mindus (n 18) 20–3.
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Beyond the link between EU citizenship and nationality, primary 
law in its current state might offer protection to UK citizens having 
children with the nationality of an EU Member State. The Zambrano22 
case law might apply in those ‘exceptional cases’ where denial of residence 
rights to the parents would force the children to leave the territory of the 
Union.23 Yet in some Member States, such as the Netherlands, the inter-
pretation of that case law is very restrictive. Dutch authorities presume 
that the children are not forced to leave the territory of the Union in 
cases where one of the parents enjoys legal residence in the Netherlands 
or is Dutch, and can take care of the children – unless it is proven by 
the claimant that the legally residing or Dutch parent is not capable of 
taking care of the children.24 The highest Dutch Court in social security 
matters, the Centrale Raad van Beroep, referred preliminary questions 
on the compatibility of the strict Dutch interpretation with Article 20 
TFEU.25
In sum, EU primary law offers little help in securing residence 
rights for British citizens in the EU. Those who are family members 
of an EU national living in the state of nationality will have to rely on 
national law. Of course Member States are bound by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and Article 8 of the Convention can 
offer protection, especially where UK citizens have acquired a right of 
permanent residence based on Article 16 of Directive 2004/38.26 In the 
Kuric´  case, the applicants were citizens of the former Socialist Republic 
of Yugoslavia who lost their permanent residence in Slovenia following 
the independence of Slovenia. In that case the Court confirmed that 
decisions ‘in the immigration sphere can in some cases amount to inter-
ference with the right to respect for private and family life’ and it ‘must 
be accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants and 
the community in which they are living constitute part of the concept 
of private life within the meaning of Article 8’.27 It is definitely true that 
this Kuric´  doctrine may offer protection after Brexit. However I doubt 
whether it helps all persons who have lawfully established residence 
22 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
23 See e.g. Case C-256/11 Murat Dereci ECLI:EU:C:2011:734, ro 67.
24 Vreemdelingencirculaire, B10, Afdeling 2.2.
25 Case C-133/15 H.C.Chavez-Vilchez e.a., pending; Opinion of AG Szpunar of 8 
September 2016.
26 Directive (EC) 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ L158/77, 
art 16. See also Piris (n 15) 10.
27 Case Kuric´  and Others v Slovenia (13 July 2010), Application No. 26828/06, paras 
351 and 352.
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prior to Brexit to retain their residence, as some seem to imply.28 In the 
words of Vidmar, the Kuric´  doctrine states that ‘once you have legally 
established permanent residency, you retain the right of residence even 
if the legal status of either your home or your host state changes, and, 
as a result of this change, your new citizenship status alone would no 
longer give you a right to reside’.29 Thus in any event the doctrine would 
not apply to those who have not yet acquired the right to permanent 
residence, and might imply a weaker position for those who recently 
decided to move abroad, arguably for the most part young people. As 
the Kuric´  doctrine is not linked to nationality, it will apply to third-
country national family members of UK citizens who have acquired the 
right to permanent residence. The doctrine would freeze existing rights, 
and its protection is territorially restricted. It does not cover the right of 
free movement within the EU.
However, other routes to safeguard rights based on former 
EU citizenship in case of withdrawal are proposed, some of them 
decoupling citizenship from nationality. In contrast to an ECJ decision 
decoupling citizenship and nationality, these proposals would show 
more democratic legitimacy due to the actors putting them forward.
A first proposal to decouple nationality and citizenship seems 
to be inherent in the ‘European associated citizenship’, guaranteeing 
post-Brexit residence rights for UK citizens. It is the first proposal 
included in a formal text, notably in a proposed amendment to a 
Resolution of the European Parliament on possible evolutions of 
and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European 
Union. This citizenship would include movement and residence rights, 
and a right to vote for the European Parliament.30 The idea seems 
sympathetic, but several objections can be made, not in the least 
that such citizenship would be subverting the political autonomy of 
the UK to exit the EU.31 In the end, the amendment was withdrawn 
28 See Mindus (n 18) 14; G Marrero González, Civis Europaeus Sum? Consequences with 
Regard to Nationality Law and EU Citizenship Status of the Independence of a Devolved Part 
of an EU Member State (Wolf Legal Publishers 2016) 206.
29 Vidmar (n 20) 283. My italics.
30 Amendment 882 to the draft Resolution on Possible evolutions of and adjustments 
to the current institutional set-up of the European Union, AFCO/8/02315, 9 November 
2016, is formulated as follows: ‘Advocates to insert in the Treaties a European associate 
citizenship for those who feel and wish to be part of the European project but are nationals 
of a former Member State; offers these associate citizens the rights of freedom of movement 
and to reside on its territory as well as being represented in the Parliament through a vote 
in the European elections on the European lists.’
31 See e.g. A Yong, ‘The Problems Associated with Associate Citizenship of the EU’ 
EUtopiaLaw (18 November 2016) https://eutopialaw.com/2016/11/18/the-prob le ms- as 
sociated-with-associate-citizenship-of-the-eu/.
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and does not figure in the final text of the Resolution, adopted on 16 
February 2017. However, it was back on the table to be included in a 
Resolution defining the European Parliament’s position on the Brexit 
agreement.32 The Resolution adopted on 5 April 2017 does indeed 
refer to ‘association’ for a future relationship between the EU and the 
UK, but is less outspoken on citizenship. It proposes that the EU-27 
‘examine’ how to address the concerns of UK citizens that they will lose 
rights linked to EU citizenship ‘within the limits of Union primary law 
whilst fully respecting the principles of reciprocity, equity, symmetry 
and non-discrimination’.33 The concept of ‘associated citizenship’ 
has disappeared, but could reappear once negotiations on a future 
 relationship start.
Secondly, emancipating the concept of EU citizenship from the 
concept of Member State nationality, at least in the event of a Member 
State withdrawing from the European Union, is also the aim of 
the citizen’s initiative ‘EU Citizenship for Europeans’, registered by 
the Commission on 22 March 2017.34 Surprisingly, the Commission 
considers the proposal not to fall manifestly outside the scope of the 
Commission’s powers to initiate legislation.35 However, if one compares 
the annex to the proposed citizens’ initiative with the Commission 
decision, it turns out the Commission gives a slight twist to the proposal. 
It considers that there is no legal basis in the treaties empowering EU 
institutions to adopt a legal act aiming at granting EU citizenship to 
persons not holding the nationality of a Member State of the Union, but 
that it may propose a legal act conferring certain similar rights to those 
linked to EU citizenship on citizens of a State that has withdrawn from 
the Union.
Thirdly, other non-state actors might try to influence the 
negotiating process by lobbying the negotiating parties for a guarantee 
32 Jon Stone, ‘EU Negotiators Will Offer Brits an Individual Opt-In to Remain EU 
citizens, Chief Negotiator Confirms’ The Independent (9 December 2016) http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-eu-citizenship-keep-freedom-of-movement-
guy-verhofstadt-chief-negotiator-opt-in-passports-a7465271.html.
33 EP Resolution of 5 April 2017 on negotiations with the United Kingdom following 
its notification that it intends to withdraw from the European Union (2017/2593 (RSP)), 
provisional edition, points 22 and 27.
34 Commission Decision of 22 March 2017 on the proposed citizens’ initiative entitled 
‘EU Citizenship for Europeans: United in Diversity in Spite of jus soli and jus sanguinis’, 
C(2017) 2001 final. See also the website of the Commission on the Citizens’ Initiative 
http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome.
35 A requirement for registration included in art 4(2)(b) of Regulation 211/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Februray 2011 on the citizens’ initiative, 
OJEU 2011, L65/1. Registration of another Brexit related citizens’ initiative, ‘Stop Brexit’, 
inviting the Commission to propose a legal act that should prevent Brexit, has been refused
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of residence rights. One could think about the network of major 
European cities, which influences and works with the EU institu-
tions to respond to ‘common issues that affect the day-to-day lives of 
Europeans’.36 As the level of governance closest to the citizens, they 
are probably well informed about the concerns citizens have about 
Brexit and are in a good position to raise their concerns with national 
and EU policy makers.37 On 17 November 2017, the mayors of the cities 
in the network published an open letter on ‘rethinking Europe’ in which 
they stated that they still see a future for UK cities in the network.38
3. Residence rights for UK nationals in the EU based 
on secondary EU law
The Citizens’ Rights Directive39 is in principle not applicable to UK 
citizens post Brexit, but it can offer protection to those who reside with 
an EU citizen in a Member State other than that of the nationality of 
the EU citizen. As a family member of an EU citizen, UK nationals have 
a derived right of residence. Their position will largely remain the 
same. However, they will lose some rights under Articles 12 and 13 of 
the Directive: their right to continue residence in the event of death or 
departure of the EU citizen, or in the event of divorce or termination 
of the relationship will require a certain period of residence in the host 
state with the EU citizen.40
The change of status from EU citizen to third-country national 
(TCN) with a residence right in a Member State based on secondary EU 
law can have dramatic consequences for daily life. Existing secondary 
EU law on access and residence for TCNs does not include a general 
for registration because it manifestly falls outside the scope of the Commission’s powers 
to submit a proposal, Commission Decision of 22 March 2017 on the proposed citizens’ 
initiative entitled ‘Stop Brexit’, C(2017), 2000 final.
36 Eurocities, ‘About Us’ http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/about_us.
37 The city of Amsterdam and Expat Center Amsterdam have created a Brexit information 
point to help answer questions UK nationals living in the Netherlands might have; see 
https://www.iamsterdam.com/en/expatcenter/expats/brexit-info-point. See also the 
concerns British citizens in Amsterdam expressed in a meeting with the mayor on 18 July 
2016 http://www.iamsterdam.com/en/expatcenter/expats/brexit-info-point/b r e x i t - m e e t i 
n g - report.
38 Eurocities, ‘Open Letter: Work with Cities to Rethink Europe’ (17 November 2016) 
http://eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/Open-let ter- wo rk-with- cit ies-to-rethink- Eu r o p e 
-WSPO-AFGP9B.
39 Directive 2004/38 (n 26).
40 At least one year in case of death or departure under art 12(2), and after a relationship 
of at least three years, including one year in the host state under art 13(2).
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rule of residence equal to Directive 2004/38. Hence, access and 
residence rights vary in conditions according to legal categories (worker, 
researcher, highly skilled, etc.). Protection of social security rights also 
varies. Below, the article will address the relevant sectoral directives, 
but it will start with residence rights based on the Family Reunification 
Directive41 and the Long-Term Residents Directive.42 At first sight these 
two directives seem to offer better protection to residence rights of UK 
citizens post Brexit. However, it is questionable whether these TCN 
residence rights can be applicable at the moment of the UK’s exit.
UK citizens forming a family with TCNs might rely on the Family 
Reunification Directive, notably when the TCN family member has an 
autonomous right of residence and can act as sponsor for family reunifi-
cation.43 Though applications for family reunification shall be submitted 
and examined when family members reside outside the territory of the 
state where the sponsor resides, Member States may derogate from that 
provision ‘in appropriate circumstances’ and could accept applications 
for UK family members already residing in the EU.44 The Directive only 
applies to sponsors and family members who are TCNs.45 Thus, applica-
tions can only be made post Brexit. Conditions for family reunification 
differ from those applicable to EU citizens: according to the Directive, 
Member States may require that the sponsor holds a residence permit 
with a period of validity of one year or more and has reasonable 
prospects of obtaining the right of permanent residence.46 The sponsor 
must have appropriate accommodation, sickness insurance and stable 
and regular resources. Member States may impose integration measures 
on TCN family members.47 Integration tests are applicable in a number 
of Member States, and could form an obstacle for UK nationals when 
trying to secure residence. However, Member States are free to adopt or 
maintain more favourable provisions.48 One might suggest that Member 
States should refrain from strict conditions on sponsors and integration 
tests for family members in the case of UK citizens. Granting more 
41 Directive (EC) 2003/86 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L 251/12.
42 Directive (EC) 2003/109 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents [2004] OJ L 16/44.
43 Probably most TCN family members derive their residence rights from UK citizens 
under the citizens’ right Directive (n 26). Post Brexit, they will lose these derived rights of 
residence.
44 Art 5 para 3.
45 Art 3 para 1.
46 Art 3 para 1. Under art 8 Member States may require the sponsor to have lawfully 
resided in their territory for a period of two years.
47 Art 7.
48 Art 3 para 5.
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favourable treatment to a single category of TCNs seems incompatible 
with equal protection before the law and a prohibition of discrimina-
tion as provided for by various human rights treaties,49 and should be 
objectively justified.50
UK citizens who have resided five years or longer in an EU host 
Member State have a right to permanent residence following Directive 
2004/38.51 Loss of EU citizenship includes loss of that residence right. 
Directive 2003/109 would allow these UK nationals to apply for the 
permanent long-term resident status and obtain a residence permit with 
a validity for five years that is automatically renewable, upon application 
if required.52 The status can be withdrawn only on grounds of public 
policy, or in the event of twelve months’ absence from the territory of 
the Union.53 A long-term resident has rights to equal treatment (notably 
with respect to access to the labour market), protection against expulsion 
and under certain conditions a right to reside in other Member States.54 
These rights come close to those of EU citizens residing in another 
Member State than that of their nationality. Five years of previous legal 
residence and financial conditions give access to the status, and Member 
States may – and do – impose integration tests. The Directive precludes 
a seamless transposition of residence as EU citizen into residence as 
long-term resident, because only TCNs can apply for the status. In 
preparation for Brexit, UK nationals can take integration tests, but only 
post Brexit can they apply for a long-term resident status.55 Unless 
measures are taken to remedy this gap, for the short period between 
application and grant of the status56 UK nationals will have to rely on 
national law to secure their residence. As stated above, national law 
would have to be applied in conformity with the Kuric´  doctrine.
UK nationals who have resided for fewer than five years in 
another Member State and are not eligible for family reunification 
might want to rely on several other directives that regulate access to the 
49 E.g. art 26 of the UN Covenant of Civil and Political Rights provides that the law ‘shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as (…) national or social origin (…).’
50 One could think of ‘closer affinity’ or ‘closer historical, cultural and spiritual bonds’ 
with the people of the Member State concerned, e.g. arguments justifying preferential 
naturalization; see e.g. K Hailbronner, ‘Nationality in Public International and European 
Law’ in R Bauböck, Acquisition and Loss of Nationality, Vol I: Comparative Analyses 
(Amsterdam University Press 2006) 42–3.
51 Art 16.
52 Art 8 para 2.
53 Art 9 and 12.
54 Arts 11–16.
55 The Directive does not apply to EU citizens, art 2(b) and art 3 para 1.
56 Art 7 para 2 sets the maximum duration of that period at six months.
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labour market of Member States and accompanying residence rights: 
the Blue Card Directive,57 the Intercorporate Transfer Directive,58 the 
Directive for Researchers, Students and Au Pairs,59 and the Directive 
for Seasonal Workers.60 Note should be taken that Article 79(5) TFEU 
explicitly recognizes the right of Member States to determine volumes of 
admission of TCNs to their labour market, and all mentioned directives 
include a similar provision.61 All directives allow only TCNs to apply 
for residence based on the respective directive. Again, UK nationals can 
only apply post Brexit. Not every status granted under the mentioned 
directives results in the possibility to apply for long-term resident status, 
because some of them have a validity that is restricted in time (seasonal 
workers,62 intracorporate transfers,63 and in principle also researchers, 
students, interns and au pairs). Researchers and students have nine 
months to find a job after completion of research or study,64 subject to 
priority for EU citizens or long-term residents residing in the relevant 
Member State.65 The residence period of students during their studies 
only counts for half in the calculation of the five years’ legal residence 
period giving access to long-term residence status.66 The Blue Card and 
the Intracorporate Transferee status specifically focus on the highly 
skilled and include a right of residence for family members under a 
more relaxed regime than that of the Family Reunification Directive, but 
Member States may impose integration tests for family members.67 The 
Blue Card can be renewed and in itself provides a basis for continuous 
residence, but the residence status is less secure than that of long-term 
residents. Blue Card holders that have resided for five years in the EU 
may apply for long-term resident status.
57 Directive (EC) 2009/50 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment [2009] L155/17.
58 Directive (EU) 2014/66 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer [2014] L157/1.
59 Directive (EU) 2016/801 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange 
schemes or educational projects and au pairing [2016] L 132/21. The Directive must be 
transposed on 23 May 2018.
60 Directive (EU) 2014/36 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals 
for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers [2014] L 94/375.
61 Directive 2009/50 art 6, Directive 2014/66 art 6, Directive 2016/801 art 21 para 5, 
and Directive 2014/36 art 7.
62 Art 14 limits the period of stay to a maximum of nine months in any twelve-month period.
63 Art 12 para 1 limits the duration of residence to a maximum of three years for 
managers and specialists and one year for trainee employees.
64 Art 25 para 1.
65 Art 21 para 5.
66 Art 4 para 2.
67 Directive 2009/50 art 15, and Directive 2014/66 art 19 and art 5 para 1(d).
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UK cross-border workers probably will need permits in two 
separate Member States post Brexit. A UK national living in Belgium 
and working in the Netherlands will have to obtain a residence permit 
in Belgium and access to the labour market in the Netherlands. A UK 
national living in the Netherlands and working in Belgium will have 
to obtain a residence permit in the Netherlands and access to the 
labour market in Belgium. The Long-Term Residents Directive leaves 
regulation of cross-border work to national law.68
In conclusion, secondary EU law offers limited possibilities for 
transforming residence as EU citizen into a TCN residence status with 
comparable security of residence, unless UK nationals can derive 
residence rights as family members of EU citizens. TCN residence 
status under EU law comes with additional conditions including 
integration tests. Furthermore, a transposition of residence status 
cannot be realized from one day to the other, whereas UK nationals 
will lose their residence rights as EU citizens from one day to the 
other. To fill the gap, the EU legislature could adopt an amending 
directive with restricted temporal validity, including a provision that 
allows UK citizens residing in the EU at a determinate date to apply 
for a TCN resident status even if they are not (yet) TCNs. In the 
event no agreement is reached in the Brexit negotiations, EU law as it 
stands would transform legally residing EU nationals into unlawfully 
residing TCNs who can only start regularizing their residence post 
Brexit.
Surprisingly, citizens themselves have found another instrument 
of secondary legislation that might bring with it residence rights, if 
slightly amended. The Choose Freedom Campaign, initiated by a British 
engineering designer, is a citizen’s initiative inspired by Regulation 
1417/2013, on the basis of which passports are sometimes issued to 
diplomats and officials, demanding a European passport for all citizens. 
The European Commision has registered the initiative on 11 January 
2017, and the collection of signatures is ongoing. The initiative begs 
‘the Commission to delineate a method by which all Europeans of good 
standing may be granted a signal & permanent instrument of their 
status and of their right to free movement throughout the Union by way 
of a unified document of laissez-passer as permitted by Article (4) of 
Council Regulation 1417/2013, or by another method’.69 As has been 
68 Art 14 para 5.
69 European Commission, ‘European Free Movement Instrument’ http://ec.europa.eu/
citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/open/details/2017/000001/en?lg=en.
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argued by Garner,70 Council Regulation 1417/2013 is rather limited in 
its scope and does not seem to provide a basis for creating a mechanism 
for free movement, because it limits the possibility to provide passports 
to ‘members of the institutions of the Union’ and ‘special applicants’ – 
defined in Annex II of the Regulation as ‘family members’ of a member 
of an institution. Therefore it seems likely that ‘another method’ has to 
be used in order to achieve a free movement mechanism, either through 
amending the scope of the Regulation or through the creation of new 
legislation providing similar rights as those linked to EU citizenship to 
citizens of a Member State that has withdrawn. In essence, this initiative 
contains an invitation to the Commission to propose the same legal act 
as requested by the citizens’ initiative EU Citizenship for Europeans 
discussed above.71
4. No residence status for EU nationals in the UK based 
on EU law?
Needless to say, EU law as such will not offer any residence basis 
for EU nationals in a post-Brexit UK. Their residence rights might 
depend on how the UK itself decides to treat EU law post Brexit. 
The UK government has announced that it will introduce a ‘Great 
Repeal Bill’ in 2017, that will repeal the European Communities 
Act 1972 and that this will take effect on the day of the UK’s exit. 
The Bill will also transfer all EU law currently in force onto the 
UK statute book.72 Post Brexit, national law transposing Directive 
2004/38, the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 
2006 and subsequent changes thereof are amenable to change or 
repeal. Mention should be made that the UK does not participate in 
the directives applying to TCNs. Therefore, the Great Repeal Bill will 
probably not have much influence on UK migration policy with respect 
to TCNs.
70 O Garner, The European Citizens’ Initiative on a European Free Movement Mechanism: 
a New Hope or a False Start for UK Nationals after Brexit? (23 February 2017) http://
europeanlawblog.eu/2017/02/23/the-european-citizens-initiative-on-a-european-free-
movement-mechanism-a-new-hope-or-a-false-start-for-uk-nationals-after-brexit/. As Garner 
signals, the initiative’s use of ‘Europeans of good standing’ is quite ‘opaque and clandestine’.
71 (n 34).
72 See e.g. S Douglas-Scott, ‘The “Great Repeal Bill”: Constitutional Chaos and 
Constitutional Crisis?’, UK Const L Blog (10 October 2016) https://ukconstitutionallaw.
org/.
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5. Residence based on national law
Those who do not want to wait for the result of the negotiations would 
be well advised to secure their right of residence on the basis of national 
law, or via naturalization.
Arguably, naturalization offers the best guarantee for security 
of residence in the future. Many countries require qualified 
forms of residence, e.g. legal or permanent residence or even a 
period of residence after acquisition of permanent residence.73 Many 
countries impose citizenship tests, and levy sometimes quite high fees. 
Not all citizens whose residence rights are affected by Brexit would 
qualify for naturalization. Here, actors on the national level could help 
to  accommodate them. An example can be found in the legislative 
proposal tabled by the German Green Party to facilitate the naturali-
zation rules for UK citizens residing in Germany.74 The proposal not 
only shortens the required period of legal residence, but also enables 
dual nationality and simplifies the integration test. An example of 
lobbying for fast-track naturalization is provided by the seven-page 
memo of November 2016 addressed to the European Commission 
and sent by a high official of the European Commission asking to put 
pressure on Member States to facilitate the process of obtaining dual 
nationality.75
Naturalization comes with certain disadvantages as well. UK 
citizens naturalizing in one of the EU Member States might have to 
renounce their British nationality, depending on national law. EU 
citizens who apply for British citizenship can keep their EU Member 
State nationality according to British law,76 but might lose it due to 
the laws of the state of their original nationality.77 Loss of original 
nationality can make visits to family in the state of original nationality 
a little less easy. Visa requirements might be introduced for UK citizens 
73 For an overview, see C Dumbrava, Nationality, Citizenship and Ethno-Cultural 
Belonging: Preferential Membership Policies in Europe (Palgrave Studies in Citizenship 
Transitions, 2014) 34–6.
74 Gesetzentwurf der Abgeordneten Volcker Beck (Köln), Özcan Mutlu, Luise Amtsberg, 
Kai Gehring, Katja Keul, Maria Klein-Schmeink, Renate Künast, Monika Lazar, Irene Mihalic, 
Dr Konstantin von Notz, Claudia Roth (Augsburg), Hans-Christian Ströbele und der Fraktion 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Erleichterung der Einbürgerung und zur 
Ermöglichung der mehrfachen Staatsangehörigkeit, Deutscher Bundestag, 18. Wahlperiode, 
Drucksache 18/5631 (23 July 2015).
75 The memo can be accessed via Tara Palmeri, ‘Top UK Eurocrat Demands Belgian 
Citizenship for Brits’ (14 November 2016) http://www.politico.eu/article/jona th an- fau ll 
- brexit-task-force-top-uk-eurocrat-demands-belgian-citizenship-for-brits/.
76 British Nationality Act 1981, s 6 and sch 1.
77 For an overview, see C Dumbrava (n 73) 63–4.
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visiting the EU, also for visits shorter than three months.78 And the 
other way around, post Brexit the UK might also introduce visa require-
ments for EU citizens through amendment of Regulation 11 of the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006. Loss of 
original nationality might also have effects in other areas, such as the 
applicable laws on succession.79
Compared to naturalization, acquiring a residence right based on 
national law in order to secure residence seems less drastic. But here 
also, countries often require periods of residence, financial guarantees, 
such as income and housing requirements, and integration tests.
National immigration law is partly determined by EU secondary 
legislation, as described above. However, the UK does not participate 
in these instruments. British immigration rules are highly complex. A 
rudimentary overview in the House of Lords report Brexit: Acquired 
Rights80 shows how the points based system results in several ‘tiers’ 
of visa category, each with sub-categories. The system also results in 
different requirements for settlement, such as ‘accelerated settlement’ 
for investors and entrepreneurs. Persons who have been granted 
indefinite leave to remain81 have access to the labour market, education 
and social security on the same term as UK citizens. At present, EU 
family members of UK citizens are not eligible for a ‘family of a settled 
person’ visa. That might change post Brexit. The visa is valid for two 
years and six months, and can be renewed. It gives access to work and 
study in the UK, but no access to social assistance. Furthermore, other 
routes to settlement exist for partners of UK citizens, and these might 
include financial and language conditions.
National immigration laws providing purely national permanent 
residence permits not affected by EU law generally require periods of 
residence, sufficient means of subsistence, and integration tests – also in 
case of non-national partners of nationals. As with residence based on 
EU secondary legislation, it is not always possible for UK citizens to apply 
for a national residence permit while still being EU citizens, as they have 
78 It depends on the listing of the United Kingdom on annex I or II of Regulation (EC) 
539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement 
[2001] L81/1.
79 The Brexit in itself might have few consequences for the application of succession 
law, because the UK does not participate in Regulation (EU) 650/2012 on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement 
of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European 
Certificate of Succession [2012] L201/107.
80 House of Lords (n 12) 13.
81 For which persons without privileged access can apply after ten years of legal residence.
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no direct individual concern in doing so. National authorities might 
want to reconsider the modes of application of national immigration 
law to UK citizens, as their individual concern in national residence 
permits has increased now that Article 50 TEU is triggered.
6. Beyond residence: rights to social security
The approach EU secondary legislation takes towards TCNs, according 
to legal categories as described above, results in fragmented rights 
of social security. Each directive has its own exceptions concerning 
the right to equal treatment for social security benefits.82 Article 11 
of the Long-term Resident Directive and Article 12, paragraphs 1 
and 4 of the Single Permit Directive83 provide for equal treatment in 
employment conditions, such as salary, dismissal, health and safety at 
work, and education and vocational training. Long-term residents have 
a right to study and maintenance grants according to national law, while 
the Single Permit Directive allows member states to exclude workers 
from these benefits.84 Long-term residents enjoy social security, social 
assistance and social protection as defined in national legislation, but 
in respect of social assistance and social protection Member States may 
limit equal treatment to ‘core benefits’.85 The Single Permit Directive 
provides for equal treatment with respect to branches of social security 
as defined in Regulation 883/2004,86 with the possibility for Member 
States to exclude those who have been employed for a period of less 
than six months.87 Family benefits are only granted if family members 
live (with the worker or independently) in the relevant Member 
State.88 And the Single Permit Directive provides for equal treatment 
of exportation of pension rights (so according to the same conditions 
and tariffs as applicable to nationals), but not with respect to other 
82 For a more extensive analysis of the fragmented rights see H Verschueren, ‘Employment 
and Social Security Rights of Third-Country Labour Migrants under EU Law: an Incomplete 
Patchwork of Legal Protection’ (2016) 18 EJML 373–408.
83 Directive (EU) on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country 
nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set 
of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State [2011] L343/1. 
The directive does not regulate residence rights, it regulates the legal position of lawfully 
residing third-country nationals.
84 Art 12 para 2(a)iii.
85 Art 11 para 4.
86 Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ 
L166/1.
87 Art 12 para 1(e) and para 2(b).
88 Recital 24 of the peamble.
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social security rights.89 The Single Permit Directive is not applicable to 
long-term residents who therefore enjoy less protection because of the 
possible limits to equal treatment with respect to the ‘core benefits’ of 
social assistance and social protection. However, all directives include 
a clause enabling Member States to introduce or maintain more 
favourable provisions.90
The Blue Card Directive also includes the right to equal treatment 
in social security, but with possible restrictions on equal treatment in 
study and maintenance grants and procedures for obtaining housing.91 
The Directive provides for equal treatment of exportation of pension 
rights.92 Post Brexit, only national law will apply in the United Kingdom. 
As mentioned above, the UK does not participate in the TCN migration 
directives. At present, equal treatment of EU nationals in the field of 
social security is based on the Social Security (Persons from Abroad) 
Amendment Regulations that determine that persons residing in the 
United Kingdom on the basis of Directive 2004/38 are not considered 
‘persons from abroad’. Post Brexit, Regulation 883/2004 will only apply 
if it is transformed into national law under the Great Repeal Bill.93 The 
Regulation now ensures equal treatment with respect to social security 
rights and receipt of pensions for EU citizens in the UK, but also ensures 
that UK citizens in Spain receive their pensions. If the UK decides not 
to transform the Regulation into national law, and in absence of an 
agreement between the EU and the UK, EU citizens will only have 
access to social security benefits such as incapacity, child and housing 
benefits if they have indefinite leave to remain.94 They will receive 
no child benefit for children not living in the UK. Whether they will 
continue to receive pension rights they accumulated elsewhere in the 
EU will depend on the national law of the State in which they acquired 
these rights. British pensioners living in the EU or EU citizens having 
acquired a state pension in the UK will receive their state pension on the 
basis of national law, but it might be frozen.
89 Art 12 para 4.
90 Verschueren (n 82) 395–6, questions the compatibility of the exclusion of the 
entitlement to benefits, such as family benefits or even unemployment benefits, with other 
European and international instruments on the rights of labour migrants or on human 
rights in general. That question is outside the scope of this article.
91 Art 14.
92 Art 14 para 1(f).
93 It would require an adaptation of the text of the Regulation, that at present applies to 
persons living in ‘Member States’.
94 For a broader overview see E Guild, ‘Brexit and Social Security in the EU’, CEPS 
Commentary (17 November 2016) https://www.ceps.eu/publications/b r e x i t - a n d - s o c i a l - s e 
curity-eu.
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7. Final remarks
An inventory of the possibilities for securing residence and social security 
rights post Brexit based on current law reveals that many people will 
lose out short of inclusion of their rights in a withdrawal agreement. 
The Brexit negotiations will turn a substantial number of citizens under 
EU law into objects of negotiation. However, actors other than the 
negotiating parties have come forward in an attempt to secure citizens’ 
rights post Brexit. Some of these actors are in a position to lobby the 
negotiating parties. Organizations defending citizens’ rights, such as 
Expat Citizen Rights in EU, and local governments united in networks 
such as Eurocities, are well aware of the concerns due to their close 
contact with citizens. They can voice these concerns and bring them to 
the attention of the negotiators. Other actors are directing their actions 
for securing citizens’ rights at national level. The proposal to change 
nationality law tabled by the German Green Party is an example thereof. 
Furthermore, non-state actors target the European level to take action 
and protect citizens’ rights. The obvious actor here is the European 
Parliament, and it hints at an ‘association’ with reciprocal rights for 
citizens. Its position in Brexit could be influential since the European 
Parliament has to give its consent to a withdrawal agreement under 
Article 50 TEU. Citizens themselves, supporting citizens’ initiatives under 
Article 11(4) TEU, have stepped forward in an attempt to protect their 
rights. The two initiatives discussed above demand the Commission to 
propose legislation that will give former EU citizens certain rights similar 
to those of EU citizens. The effectiveness of these initiatives is however 
questionable, since obtaining the required number of signatures is in 
itself no guarantee that the Commission will undertake action.
All of the above shows that the concerns people have about losing 
out from Brexit are not without reason. Furthermore, it shows that 
the Brexit vote has inspired activities that go beyond the occasional 
lobbying for a particular outcome of the negotiation process as is a 
normal phenomenon in foreign relations.95 Taken together, all these 
activities seem to show that at least several actors want the EU to take 
Article 3 TEU seriously and not only offer an area of freedom, security 
and justice to its citizens, but also to ‘protect its citizens’ in its relations 
with the wider world.112 European Commission (n 76):
95 Examples of lobbying within the UK can be found in a joint open letter from the British 
Chambers of Commerce and Trade Unions to Prime Minister May, calling on her to make 
a ‘bold unilateral move’ and guarantee EU workers a right to remain in the UK post Brexit.
